The Emergence and Growth Path of Shanzhai Firms by Shay, Jason et al.
Proceedings of Engineering and Technology Innovation, vol. xx, 201x, pp. xx-xx 







, Hsiang-Jui Cheng3 
1
Boeing Global Services, Dallas, TX, USA 
2
Department of Automation Engineering, National Formosa University, Yunlin, Taiwan 
3
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, Ltd., Taichung, Taiwan 
Received 11 April 2019; received in revised form 09 May 2019; accepted 26 June 2019 
 
Abstract 
Shanzhai refers to a set of dynamic strategies for firms to grow out of counterfeiting. Shanzhai firms have 
traditionally been perceived as counterfeiters from the emerging economies producing cheap and low-quality 
products. This trend has changed in recent years when Shanzhai firms have grown into market leaders and have 
introduced leading technologies and applications. This paper focuses on the growth of Shanzhai firms by exploring 
how Shanzhai firms and Shanzhai industries emerged. We further investigate the context that supports the 
emergence of Shanzhai firms into market leaders. We leverage two case studies using the growth path of two market 
leaders in their respective industries to illustrate the two paths leading to the emergence of Shanzhai firms. We 
attempt to show that although Shanzhai firms start out with low legitimacy, these firms grow their legitimacy over 
time by building their core competitiveness in their respective industries. 
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1. Introduction 
Although imitation is considered as a type of strategy that firms often employee, counterfeit (imitations that infringe 
intellectual properties) is not generally accepted as a legitimate set of strategies for firms to practice [1-2]. However, it is 
intriguing that several firms considered as counterfeiters not too long ago have grown out of the emerging economies into big 
multinational firms and even market leaders. In this research, we attempt to address the concept of Shanzhai and the 
development path of Shanzhai firms leading them to become major players in their respective industries. 
Originating from China, the concept of Shanzhai bloomed in the last two decades. Shanzhai refers to a set of dynamic 
strategies for firms to grow out of counterfeiting. Shanzhai is borrowed from the historical description of rural and unregulated 
villages in the mountains with their own leaders, armed forces, governance structures, and rules that are outside of the main 
country government regulations [3]. Thus, the term Shanzhai describes Chinese firms’ practices of either counterfeiting or 
manufacturing closely imitated products and/or brands, evading laws and regulations. These firms are originally referred to as 
Shanzhai firms. Public perceptions of Shanzhai products are lookalike products with substandard quality that sell at lower 
prices [3]. Overall, public perceptions of Shanzhai have been negative over the past two decades. Yet the growth of Shanzhai 
firms has been unmistakable. 
Although research on the growth of the firm in emerging economies has been expanding since the 1990s [4], the term 
Shanzhai had not appeared in the management literature until 2009 [5]. Until now, most literature focuses on distinguishing 
Shanzhai from counterfeit, or on investigating marketing strategies or consumer preferences. By definition, counterfeit is the 
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practice to capitalize on external competences without proper authorizations. If a firm develops own competences out of 
counterfeiting, it is a Shanzhai firm as opposed to a counterfeit firm. In the management literature, however, how Shanzhai 
firms develop and how such development change over time remains unclear. Therefore, we ask the following three interesting 
but underexplored questions: How do firms evolve into Shanzhai firms? What is the development path of Shanzhai firms? How 
do Shanzhai strategies help firms grow? We argue that the distinguishing factor between Shanzhai firms and counterfeiters lies 
in whether the firms ultimately build up their own core competencies to explore and exploit further business opportunities and 
markets or not. 
Three contributions emerge. First, contributing to the Shanzhai literature, this research is among the first effort attempting 
to examine the emergence and impact of Shanzhai strategies. Second, we contribute to the emerging economies literature by 
examines the strategies help late-mover firms from emerging economies tap into mainstream technological developments and 
even become market- leading firms. Third, contributing to the innovation literature, this research shows how Shanzhai brings 
about another form of the innovative system. 
2. Original Equipment Manufacturers 
Since Shanzhai was brought into the management literature in 2009, current literature considers Shanzhai as a more 
dynamic strategy. In earlier stages of an industry lifecycle, many of the current Shanzhai firms started out as Original 
Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) that build products designed and ordered by branding firms [3]. During this period, some 
OEM firms would sell—to separate markets and customers—substandard products and/or excess products intentionally 
produced [1]. As compared to non-OEM late-comer firms, these OEM firms would be at an advantage due to two reasons. First, 
these firms gained technological advantages by learning from branding firms. Some of these OEM firms even enjoyed 
financial and/or technological resources from branding firms to perform research and development, and to fulfill production 
tasks by branding firms. Second, OEM firms can defer such fixed costs as machinery on to products sold to branding firms, 
giving them pricing advantages when selling Shanzhai products on the markets. 
More recently, after decades of outsourcing practices, multinational branding firms began the practice of 
multiple-sourcing [6].  While single-sourcing aims at sourcing some parts of production processes that are outside of firms’ 
competences, multiple-sourcing allows branding firms to further reduce costs by allocating and reallocating procurement 
orders among multiple OEM firms. From branding firms’ perspectives, multiple-sourcing defers a portion of transaction costs 
between branding firms and OEM firms, onto OEM firms by ensuring competition among OEM firms. However, from OEM 
firms’ perspectives, multiple-sourcing dramatically increases OEM firms’ costs and risks. For instance, if OEM firms lose 
orders, it is not likely they could quickly find alternative orders to fill their idle capacities that OEM firms prepared for the 
branding firms. 
Due to the competition among OEM firms, many OEM firms are already equipped with product design capabilities and 
sufficient technological capabilities and production capacities to produce the final products that are transforming into Original 
Design Manufacturers (ODM) firm (OEM firms that also design for the branding firms). When OEM and ODM firms face 
over-competition or seek to find alternative methods to lower their dependence on branding firms, some OEM and ODM firms 
choose to cooperate with other branding firms. In addition, certain OEM and ODM firms begin introducing their own products 
into the market either through lookalike products or with new brand names owned by the OEM and ODM firms. The process of 
using the capabilities originally to serve the branding firms to divert into their own brands is Shanzhai. Fig. 1 illustrates the 
evolution of OEM and ODM firms into Shanzhai firms and then into branding firms. 
In the case of Shanzhai, both routes exist. The first route begins with some OEM firms producing mass quantities of 
“white-tagged” products, which are products without a logo printed on them. When branding firms (which could be 
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well-established firms or small new firms) come to these OEM firms, branding firms can order from these existing products. 
The OEM firms then print the branding firms’ logos onto the products for sale. The second route begins when OEM firms 
introduce their own brands. These OEM firms would be likely to design their own products based on the designs that were 
originally used to produce the products of their clients. No matter which route the OEM firms choose, up to this point, these 
OEM firms could be doing the Shanzhai business in the grey area of counterfeit. 
 
Fig. 1 The evolution of OEM and ODM firms into Shanzhai firms and then into branding firms 
Traditional viewpoint on counterfeiting firms’ points to the direction that counterfeiting firms do not really possess their 
own competences [7]. These counterfeiting firms merely imitate products and/or services on the market. More recently, 
scholars have challenged this perspective by highlighting that counterfeiting is a significantly big industry to be viewed as 
homogeneous [7]. Scholars try to introduce a more heterogeneous viewpoint in an attempt to account for different 
counterfeiting practices. Scholars were able to ascertain how counterfeiting firms specialize in different forms of 
counterfeiting strategies. Shanzhai firms would use some strategies that are classified as counterfeit (such as producing 
knockoffs or look-alike products) but Shanzhai firms also show capabilities to develop their own competencies [3, 8]. In sum, 
counterfeiting firms demonstrate the behavior to capitalize on other firms’ competences. While it is observed that Shanzhai 
firms also demonstrate the same behavior, the difference between Shanzhai firms and counterfeit firms lies in the development 
of a firm’s own competences. If a firm develops own competences out of counterfeiting, it is a Shanzhai firm as opposed to a 
counterfeit firm. 
In the case of OEM firms’ transformation, some OEM firms begin as almost counterfeiters, producing products similar to 
their branding-firm clients. With capabilities in both product and manufacturing processes, some of these OEM firms become 
Shanzhai firms when they deviate from the prevalent designs and begin introducing new products and/or serving different 
market niches as the prevalent products do. 
Taiwanese bicycle manufacturing industry started out as OEM manufacturers that produce metal-based products, such as 
screws, bolts, and automotive parts. With these competencies in metal processing, companies first stepped into bicycle OEM 
industry in the late 1970s when the U.S.-based bicycle branding companies started placing bicycle orders with these OEMs. 
Since then, OEMs worked its way from pure OEM make-to-order to ODM that not only manufacture but also design bicycles 
for branding firms. The most important difference between OEMs and an ODMs lies in whether sourcing firms rely on the 
manufacturers in designing products (i.e. products are designed by sourcing firms or by the manufacturer). During those years 
as OEMs and ODMs, Taiwanese firms strengthened many of their competencies such as metal processing and manufacturing 
processes, and also gained many competencies such as metal structuring and material technologies. 
In the later years of OEM/ODM and branding collaboration, branding firms had multiple OEM firms and ODM firms 
working competitively at the same time. Due to intense competition among branding firms’ OEM and ODM partners, OEM 
and ODM firms need not only to fulfill procurement orders ahead of schedule, but for OEM and ODM firms had to do much 
more at their own expense, both in design and manufacturing aspects. For example, OEM and ODM firms had to prepare 
excess production capacities (free, of course) to what they needed to fulfill branding firms’ orders. Furthermore, OEM and 
ODM firms had to perform research and development at their own costs on many aspects, such as improving production speed 
and quality and developing new materials and designing new structures for branding firms to develop its next products. When 
all of these competitive pressures kicked in, OEM and ODM firms that are out-competed would either be left out of the next 
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procurement or receive less order from branding firm, and the OEM and ODM firms will be left with hefty fixed costs to 
allocate. Therefore, these OEM and ODM firms had to find other ways to cover these costs. With all the production and 
technological edge at hand, some OEM and ODM firms realized their risk of competition among their counterparts, and 
decided that there was a need to begin developing their own “bikes” and “brand” from what their learned from branding firms 
and from the capabilities it developed originally to serve branding firms [9]. 
From the case, we suggest that some Shanzhai firms and industries are actually fostered by branding firms themselves. 
Many suppliers began by serving mainstream branding companies. However, strategies by those branding firms, such as 
multiple-sourcing, caused many producers to be left out of the supply chain with full research and development (R&D), 
technological, and production capabilities. These OEM firms have to come up with ways to fill their capacities when branding 
firms decide to the source of competing for OEM firms. Shanzhai has emerged as a major way to enable such growth. 
3. Technological Modularization 
For firms without an OEM background, past research finds a second path leading to Shanzhai. Researchers find that the 
ability in modularizing products and technologies in the value chain is one important factor distinguishing Shanzhai firms from 
pure counterfeiting firms [8, 10]. Technology management literature provides modularization with a formal definition that 
modularization is a strategy used to efficiently organize complex products and processes [11]. Modularized systems are 
designed in such a manner that independent components are bundled up and work as an integrated whole unit [12]. According 
to Campagnolo et al. [13], the basic concept behind the modular design is to minimize interdependence between modules while 
maximizing interdependence within the modules. Scholars find that modular design is constructive in promoting new designs 
with a shorter production lead-time [3, 14-15]. 
In industries that are highly modularized, Shanzhai firms evolve along two paths: (1) Shanzhai firms assisting the 
formation of modularized technologies and (2) Shanzhai firms exploiting the benefits of modularized technologies. 
Modularization helps Shanzhai firms by providing them with flexibilities to change, such as adopting different technologies 
and adopting new technological developments. Scholars believe that Shanzhai firms could find and tap into a position in the 
already established value chains and that Shanzhai firms could bring new values to existing industries and value chains. 
Scholars have identified that modularization is an important common ground for thriving Shanzhai industries [8, 10]. 
Shanzhai firms are likely to thrive around industries or value chains that are highly modularized. Modularization in industries 
or value chains often implies that the industries or value chains are highly specialized, allowing firms to find specific positions 
to tap into, rather than needing to have the whole set of know-how in the products or services. For example, during the early 
2000s when smartphones were introduced, only firms that owned the whole set of technologies are able to design smartphones, 
such as Apple and Samsung. Approximately ten years later, smartphone components are modularized into sub-sections, such 
as camera modules, antenna modules, and touchscreen modules. Nowadays, relatively small and young companies entering the 
final product market can all procure components and/or modules sold by specialized module and/or component producers and 
integrate those components and modules into the prototypes of final products that are ready to be outsourced to professional 
manufacturers for mass production. Through modularization, technological entry barriers to the industry would be lowered that 
even small firms with much fewer resources and technological capabilities can now design smartphones and have the chances 
to actually introduce their products to the market [16]. 
In addition, the modularization also brings opportunities to Shanzhai firms by providing flexibilities for firms to produce 
final products. Technological modularization provides firms with more options in choosing and switching components. For 
example, the practice of pin-to-pin substitution (meaning that the Shanzhai product perfectly follows the prevalent designs for 
client firms to use) is a well-known strategy promoted by Shanzhai firms to urge branding firms to switch the components used 
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in their products. Subsequent to modularization took place, unified standards and/or protocols would likely emerge, and the 
component manufacturers could follow the leading standards and/or protocols. Therefore, downstream firms would have more 
flexibility in switching among suppliers. In sum, modularization provides both existing and new firms with the flexibilities to 
introduce new designs cheaper and faster  [15, 17-18]. 
So why do industries and value chains modularize? The current literature points toward two main reasons, technological 
complexity, and economies of scale [8, 10, 17]. Take the cell-phone camera module as an example. During the first couple of 
generations of Apple’s iPhone, Apple designs everything ranging from processor chips to cameras, speakers, antennas, and so 
on. Over the years, iPhone designs evolve into being lighter and thinner and are more advanced. The components used in 
iPhones also evolve to be considerably more complicated than the designs and technologies behind the components used in 
iPhones developed beyond Apple’s capabilities to handle. Nowadays, Apple depends on specialized firms to produce 
modularized components for Apple to put into its iPhone designs. While Apple is an expert in designing smartphones, it would 
be challenging for Apple to be specialized in all the technologies required to design entire smartphones. 
At the same time, the economy of scale could be demonstrated by knowing that when smartphones become smaller, the 
manufacturing and assembling processes become increasingly complicated. It would take several significantly expensive and 
specialized machinery (that may not be useful in producing any other products) to produce camera modules or to assemble 
components into the final products. It is practically impossible for Apple to own all the technologies and machinery to make 
iPhone end-products. Therefore, ultimately Apple would realize that there is a need to design their products based on 
modularized components that they can outsource to specialized manufacturers for production. This is also the first source of 
how Shanzhai firms emerge out of technological modularization, by assisting technological modularization in the industries. 
In this section, we demonstrate the second type of Shanzhai using the case of some Taiwanese and Chinese IC designing 
companies. These companies start out using counterfeit strategies, imitating the market leaders’ designs, but some of them are 
now emerging as a competitor to leaders in low-end smartphone chipsets markets. Most of these latecomers were IC designer 
and IC service provider under IC OEM firm. These firms were firms that are very closely working with different streams of IC 
design technologies and is very flexible in making adjustments according to their clients’ designs. Figure 2 illustrates how 












Fig. 2 Technological modularization induces the formation of Shanzhai firms 
After leaders began to dominate the smartphone processor market, latecomers began to follow leaders from generation, 
structure, to specifications that leaders put on their processor chips. Latecomers introduce these processor chips not only to 
small smartphone companies but also to big companies as a cheap alternative for their lower-end smartphones. Furthermore, 
latecomers began packaging complementary components relating to processor chips into chipsets. This way, latecomers 
further helped smaller companies by reducing the complexities for firms to design smartphones. Since processor chipsets are 
the “hearts” to smartphones, by taking the burden to design processor chips out of smartphone designers, latecomers 
dramatically lowered entry barriers for firms to design smartphones. More recently, latecomers work closely with small 
smartphone companies in customizing specialized processor chips. [3, 8, 10, 19]. This way, these latecomers gain their market 
by further reduce entry barriers to late-coming smartphone designers. 
From the example of IC designers, it would not be hard to tell the differences between pure counterfeit firms from 
Shanzhai firms. While pure counterfeit firms only copy and sell branding firms’ products, Shanzhai firms may start out similar 
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to counterfeit firms, but Shanzhai firms would also open up other routes to serve underserved market segments. As scholars 
pointed out, Shanzhai firms’ development would broaden up as they invest more resources into their respective industries [20]. 
For example, with Shanzhai firms’ capabilities in integrating new technologies or introducing technologies from other fields, 
or by integrating the needs to serve different market segments, Shanzhai firms are able to open up market opportunities. 
Furthermore, while most counterfeiters may continuously look for different products to counterfeit, Shanzhai firms actually 
move between counterfeiting and creating. Even until today, undeniably that late-coming IC designers are still closely 
following the development of market leaders, however, we can also see latecomers actively involving in creating very genuine 
products and solutions to the market and serve market niches that leaders may have overlooked. Figure 3 illustrates the role of 










Fig. 3 The role of core competency development in counterfeiters’ transition into Shanzhai firms 
4. Inputs for Determination of JMF 
There are many advantages for firms to practice Shanzhai strategies. First, Shanzhai strategies provide firms with a 
lowered entry barrier into specific industries and in a faster way [20-21]. For some industries such as smartphones or processor 
chips, it is very expensive for firms to enter the industries in a completely genuine way and also very hard for firms to establish 
their market positions. For example, while leading firms spend on average between $100-200 million developing one 
generation of processor chips [22], this amount would be a huge burden for latecomers to invest at early stages. By first 
imitating or counterfeiting established firms, Shanzhai firms could accumulate resources early on and then decide whether they 
would depart from counterfeiting existing technologies and products and begin developing their genuine technologies and 
products. We see many firms started out making almost identical phones with almost identical technological specifications to 
leading brands. In recent years, these two brands began making their own technological advancements. For example, a smaller 
and younger smartphone company from Asia introduced its very first processor chip design, which cost it more than 100 
million dollars in research and development [23]. Without the capital resources it accumulated in the past by selling Shanzhai 
smartphones, it would not be able to achieve this goal. 
Second, the innovation path in Shanzhai innovation networks broadens up the deeper the firms are involved in the 
industry, as opposed to traditional innovative networks where the innovation path would narrow down after a period of time [3]. 
Scholars argued that the reason behind this finding is that Shanzhai firms would become more flexible in their capabilities to 
integrate new concepts, new designs, and new technologies into their own products and designs. For example, smartphone 
designers have been incorporating graphics processing technologies to strengthen the photographic and retouching aspects of 
smartphones to become specialized in targeted product markets. In a traditional network, however, firms that are specialized in 
developing cutting-edge technologies will be likely to get stuck into the technological and product paradigms that got them 
successful in the first place. 
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On the other hand, the current literature also points out some liabilities that Shanzhai firms would encounter. First, public 
perception and brand image on Shanzhai firms and Shanzhai products tend to be more on the negative sides. For example, many 
people still believe that Shanzhai smartphones are inferior to name-brand smartphones, although third-party testing has shown 
that some Shanzhai smartphones actually perform better. While many benchmark testings show that Shanzhai smartphones are 
either at par with or exceeding performances of high-end branding models. Also, many of Shanzhai smartphones now have 
genuine designs and components. However, public perception would perceive the Shanzhai firm as producing substandard 
products or well overpriced if selling at competitive prices to high-end branding models. 
Second, Shanzhai firms also have a higher risk of being sued. As profitability for branding firms becomes lower, many 
branding firms blame Shanzhai firms for depriving branding firms’ profits. Therefore, branding firms have been raising 
intensive patenting wars on Shanzhai firms. Many Shanzhai firms have been feeling this heat. For example, many famous 
smartphones designers started out as Shanzhai firms have been sued by branding firms such as Apple, Qualcomm, and Microsoft 
over patent infringement. Some products even get banned from selling in the European Union or the United States. Lee et al. [18] 
pointed out that actions such as counterfeit or imitation commonly observed in Shanzhai firms could become potentially 
problematic due to the very fine line between being legal or illegal [24]. 
The related the question to be asked here is: why do we see more Shanzhai activities in emerging economies? Although 
there are still many liabilities to be Shanzhai firms, we still see Shanzhai strategies flourish in emerging economies. Current 
literature provides us some clues to the reason why. To date, most firms from emerging economies could be considered as 
latecomers to their industries. As latecomers, it is crucial for these firms both to utilize the resources they have at hand and to 
find the fastest way to catch up [20]. First, while many firms from developed economies use emerging economies as their 
production bases, due to lowered costs and regulations, emerging economies are packed with technologies and capacities to 
produce cutting-edge products. These technologies and capacities, in turn, become resources for the late-comer firms from 
emerging economies to work with. Second, using the metaphor from Formula One, when taking over racers in the front, one will 
first have to closely follow the racer in the front. By closely following the lead racer in the front, there are many advantages such 
as smoother aerodynamics and knowledge about road conditions. Using similar logic, when latecomers from emerging 
economies try to follow the development paths of market leaders, latecomers enjoy advantages such as reduced research and 
development costs and more developed markets [17, 20-21]. Third, as market needs and consumer preferences differ across 
countries and that most branding firms develop their products based on needs and preferences from their home countries, many 
market niches from emerging markets remained to be filled [3, 19]. These market niches leave rooms for Shanzhai firms to work 
with. Shanzhai firms can learn from branding firms, modify branding firms’ products according to local needs and preferences, 
and better serve these underserved markets. 
5. Discussion and Contributions 
Three contributions emerge from this research. First, contributing to the Shanzhai literature, this research is among the first 
effort attempting to qualitatively examine the emergence and the impact of Shanzhai strategies. We used two case studies to 
demonstrate how a firm with a background as an OEM firm utilizes Shanzhai strategies to penetrate new markets and to become 
a renowned brand. We also demonstrated how Shanzhai firms capitalize on modularized technologies to lower entry barriers and 
to innovate and introduce new products. Second, contributing to the emerging economies literature, this research examines how 
strategies help late-moving firms from emerging economies tap into mainstream technological developments and even become 
market-leading firms. Third, contributing to the innovation literature, this research shows how Shanzhai brings about another 
form of the innovative system. As shown in the previous sections, Shanzhai firms have now evolved from counterfeiting firms 
into distinctive industries and networks that are able to produce their own competences and innovations. Therefore, Shanzhai 
could become another innovation system that is distinct from those innovation systems that we are familiar with. 
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6. Future Research 
Shanzhai has been widely utilized and has been effective for some firms not only to gain market positions but to become 
market leaders. It is safe to say that Shanzhai may be an effective way for latecomers to catch up with leading firms. However, 
when firms grow stronger and even become leaders, some questions still await to be answered. First, when Shanzhai firms with 
inferior technologies develop into being more sophisticated, their technological capabilities may be as strong as or even 
stronger than firms that they used to imitate. For example, many of the applications by Alibaba (Taobao), Tencent (Wechat), 
and ZTE Corporation are exceeding their counterparts from developed economies. Under this situation, their options to imitate 
others would be very limited. How will their growth strategies evolve? 
Second, when Shanzhai firms become leaders in their industries, what will they do to secure their positions? Compared to 
leading firms, Shanzhai firms may not be used to defend their intellectual properties [1-2]. When these Shanzhai firms grow 
stronger, their intellectual properties would increase that there would be firms out there trying to imitate them. How will these 
Shanzhai firms use and protect their resources? For example, how will Shanzhai firms use (or support) the concepts of open 
contents versus traditional copyrights? 
Third, since public perceptions are likely to link Shanzhai firms more with inferior technologies and brand imitators when 
Shanzhai firms develop into innovative products, how do Shanzhai firms manage public perceptions and their brand images? 
Fourth, if “Shanzhai” refers latecomers from less-developed economies imitating market-leading firms from developed 
economies, “reverse-Shanzhai” is the imitation behavior by market-leaders on latecomers. This is now becoming a noticeable 
phenomenon that market-leading firms (such as Facebook from the United States) are now actually “reverse-Shanzhai” on 
their counterparts from less-developed economies, such as Wechat by Tencent. Facebook’s founder and CEO Mark 
Zuckerberg publically admit Facebook’s desire to learn from Wechat and that What's functions and business models could help 
fuel Facebook’s growth [25-27]. With the rise of reverse-Shanzhai, questions yet to be answered raise from both sides. For 
example, how will the intellectual battlefield transform while both parties are protecting, exploiting, and exploring all at the 
same time? How will the inter-company relationship become between companies on the two ends of the spectrum? 
Finally, although Shanzhai as a term is Chinese in origin, Shanzhai strategies are not limited to firms in emerging 
economies in general. Numerous firms in today’s developed economies such as Britain, Canada, Germany, Japan, and the 
United States undertook what can be called Shanzhai strategies when their economies were taking off [28]. How these 
strategies are phased out as IPR protection tightens around the world and as these firms’ capabilities to go after high-end 
markets develop will remain a fascinating area for future research. 
7. Conclusions 
This paper explores how Shanzhai firms emerge. We demonstrated the two contexts that foster Shanzhai firms, and why 
the Shanzhai phenomenon bloomed from emerging economies and continue to be widespread in emerging markets. Shanzhai 
firms begin as counterfeiters and some of them have successfully evolved into innovative firms with their own competences 
that even become global leaders in their respective industries. While the majority of the Shanzhai behaviors are observed on 
firms from the emerging economies nowadays, firms with more advanced technological capabilities from developed 
economies have been observed to reverse-Shanzhai on firms from the emerging economies. Therefore, the Shanzhai 
phenomenon is not specific to the emerging economies, but Shanzhai can and will be a type of growth strategies that 
companies use to grow their competencies even further. 
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